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Abstract: The diaspora studies literature recently has indicated an expansion in state-led 
diaspora engagement initiatives and burgeoning diaspora governance institutions around the 
world. Home states have correlated concepts such as public diplomacy and soft power with 
these nascent incentives to cultivate and mobilize diasporas for state interests. Despite the 
interpretation of these developments as the expansion of citizenship rights for the diaspora 
and their systematic incorporation back into the home nation, some authors remain skeptical 
about the multifaceted motives behind such initiatives. Authoritarian states particularly 
employ diaspora governance as a mechanism to monitor and control diaspora groups, which 
home communities perceive as dissidents. Using Turkey and its recent diaspora governance 
policy as a case study, this article demonstrates that diaspora governance enables the state to 
create, depending on the context, potentially ideological and repressive transnational state 
apparatuses that can assume both positive and negative forms. 
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Recent decades have seen the recognition of diasporas as emerging non-state actors in the 
international arena with potency and leverage to act as agents of change. International NGOs 
and supranational organizations approach diaspora communities to act as bridges between 
home and host country policy-makers, and home and host country political actors themselves 
reach out for various reasons to diasporas as resources.
1
 Until recently, most diaspora 
research has focused on how the states in the Global North “receive” outsiders and has 
devoted limited scrutiny to the role of sending states in shaping opportunity structures 
abroad.
2
 Nascent studies indicate the rise of state-led diaspora engagement initiatives and the 
mushrooming of diaspora governance institutions around the world.
3
 This might originate 
from the migration-development nexus,
4
 the idea of enhancing the global competitiveness of 
the country in the knowledge-based economy
5
 and the desires of sending states to utilize the 
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social, political and economic capital that diasporas accumulate abroad.
6
 Concepts such as 
public diplomacy
7
 or diaspora diplomacy
8
 have entwined with these recent state-led 
initiatives. Despite the interpretation of these developments as the expansion of citizenship 
rights for diasporas and their systematic incorporation back into the nation, some authors 
remain skeptical about the multifaceted motives behind such initiatives. For instance, 
prominent scholars such as Laurie Brand have argued that the formulation of diaspora 
policies seeks to “penetrate and surveil the community abroad as an extension of the 
authoritarian state apparatus.”9 Recently, empirical analyses of various case studies have 
shown that diaspora governance is not a straightforward policy formulated by governments to 
keep up with globalization or neo-liberal trends but that the objectives of home states are 
multidimensional. For instance, SimonTurner’s extensive study on the Rwandan diaspora 
revealed that while the homeland actors started treating the diaspora as agents of economic 
development or as unofficial ambassadors for the country, they also constructed diaspora 
engagement policies that aimed to suppress voices deemed political or security threats.
10
 
Such ulterior motives clearly emphasize the ease with which soft policies of diaspora 
management accompany stringent politics of security, surveillance, and retribution.
11
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The literature argues that state-led diaspora policies can have multiple roles and 
varying impacts on different segments of the diaspora population. In this article, we build on 
this literature and discuss the negative and positive diaspora governance policies that sending 
states formulate to engage with their diasporas abroad. We selected Turkey as a case study, 
because it provides ample examples ranging from public diplomacy initiatives to 
transnational authoritarianism.
12
 A country such as Turkey, which has sent migrants to 
Europe and elsewhere in the world for more than five decades, undoubtedly constructed 
policies to deal with emigration. It is, with its current policy, “reclaiming” its diaspora while 
redefining who is a part of the nation and who can represent state interests abroad.
13
 Turkey 
concurrently is undergoing domestic transformation and changing the way it deals with its 
citizens abroad. It is consequently internationalizing power struggles and altering the state 
identity. 
The AKP (Justice and Development Party) has transformed the country since it came 
to power in 2002. Trailing its first couple years of rule were extravagant expectations of 
democratic reform and prosperity. Ascension to the European Union (EU) was still a 
possibility, and the AKP shook off the Kemalist legacy by challenging the military and 
bureaucratic tutelage, then a norm rather than an exception in Turkey.
14
 However, the party 
shed its democratic tendencies as it consolidated power. The 2013 Gezi protests constituted a 
turning point for its democratic decline, and subsequent events including the collapse of the 
Turkish-Kurdish peace talks and the failed coup attempt in 2016 delivered for the country a 
total authoritarian crackdown.
15
 The transformation of the AKP influenced the conception of 
domestic and foreign policy priorities, including diaspora policy. Although the initial 
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objective was to utilize diaspora policy to foster a positive image of Turkey abroad using 
transnational actors and actions as public diplomacy and tools of soft power,
16
 political 
developments compelled the ruling party to shift its focus toward consolidating power.
17
 By 
simultaneously forging negative and positive diaspora policy, the AKP created an intricate 
series of relationships with Turkish citizens and their relatives living abroad.
18
  
 
Although Turkish domestic politics always have influenced Turkey’s diaspora 
communities, we highlight a new trend in Turkey’s engagement with its citizens and their 
descendants abroad. The establishment of the Office for Turks Abroad and Related 
Communities (YTB) and other state institutions testify to the fact that President Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan and consecutive AKP governments invested significantly in the potential of 
Turkish diasporas. Some interpret this as the empowerment of Turkey’s diaspora 
communities abroad.
19
 However, the diaspora is notably situated in a space that forges 
competing narratives.
20
 In this article, we examine whether Turkey has a “one size fits all” 
policy or has formulated different policies to address competing diaspora narratives. 
Scrutinizing the nexus of the sending state and diaspora in detail gives us insight into “state 
resilience” in the international arena and the “new practices of sovereignty.”21 What motives 
and interests drive Turkey’s recent interest in its diaspora? How does Turkey design its 
diaspora policy as a “spectacle to establish sovereignty”22 in its populations living abroad? 
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We demonstrate that Turkey employed its new diaspora policy and the nexus of institutions 
created as a result of sometimes discursive and sometimes repressive transnational state 
apparatuses
23
 to cultivate, supervise, and command the diaspora. Some aspects of these 
policies benefited all members of the diaspora, while others privileged certain segments of 
the community but disadvantaged or oppressed others.  
 
State-led Diaspora Engagement: Diaspora-building and Governance 
Scholars in recent decades have sought to conceptualize the interactions of sending states 
with their diasporas. Recently, however, the institutionalization of these relationships has 
begun to gather broader attention. Laurie Brand
24
 argued that still characterizing the 
international system is the presence and interaction of sovereign states. However, these 
states’ acknowledging the importance of their diasporas and formulating multifaceted 
policies for engagement became the focus of scrutiny, as it clearly demonstrated that nation 
states were not challenged by but instead adapted to globalization. Concepts such as 
“diaspora management” or “diaspora governance” became popular to define state-driven 
initiatives for forming policies to strengthen links with citizens and their descendants abroad 
as well as attracting certain segments of this population back to the homeland.
25
 Authors such 
as  Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho,
26
 however, prefer concepts such as “diaspora strategies” to underline 
the selectivity of these policies and refer to how home states mobilize elite migrants while 
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neglecting others, based on their utility for state interests and to enhance the global 
competitiveness of the homeland. 
 
State-led diaspora engagement may originate from economic, political, or social 
motives
27
 and includes introducing rights such as expatriate voting, facilitating bureaucratic 
issues with home country policy-makers, and digitizing consulates and embassies for ease of 
access. These policies usually are multifaceted and encompass both symbolic and 
bureaucratic changes
28
 with varying motives, such as cultivating or recognizing the diaspora. 
For instance, some states such as Morocco or Jordan perceive their citizens abroad as 
“exploitable resources” rather than simply citizens, and economic considerations are pivotal 
in the formulation of state-led diaspora engagement policies.
29
 Lebanon launched a state 
initiative to interact with Lebanese communities outside its borders and established a separate 
Ministry of Expatriates after the end of the civil war. According to Brand, this institution was 
created as an imperative tool for the organization of relations with those who remained and 
those who fled, crafting a new authority to deal with arranging remittances from diasporas. 
Also salient in this context are the changing perceptions about emigration. For instance, 
Nicole Hirt and Saleh Mohammad
30
 show that in the Eritrean case the government initially 
attempted to punish emigrants but gradually shifted toward a pragmatic understanding and 
began to perceive members of the diaspora as an additional source of tax revenue. Beyond 
economic motives, some states may engage with their diaspora for political purposes such as 
nation-building or for lobbying host country governments in the interests of their home 
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country.
31
 Many states also visibly associate diaspora governance with nation-branding
32
 and 
public diplomacy.
33
 Formulating a nexus of institutions to embrace populations abroad could 
bolster a nation’s image while creating a soft power tool for home states to promote their 
interests by subcontracting certain roles to diaspora members as brand ambassadors of the 
state.
34
 Nation branding is strongly associated with nation-building, and states can 
instrumentalize diaspora policies to further state legitimacy both for domestic populations 
and the international audience.
35
 State-led diaspora initiatives therefore often can morph into 
propaganda machines for the ruling elites.
36
 Diasporas earn from these policies the 
“opportunity to rejoin the national community.”37 However, do diaspora governance policies 
embrace all citizens and their descendants living abroad? As Harris Mylonas
38
 demonstrates, 
a state might adapt various policies to control and manage their diaspora, ranging from 
neglecting them completely to neglecting specific communities but not others to strategically 
keeping abroad or favoring certain groups. 
 
Other alternative explanations also highlight the complexity of diaspora governance. 
According to Turner,
39
 states may “stage” their diaspora in the sense of creating a specific 
positive image for themselves. He demonstrates that the Rwandan state, for instance, utilizes 
its diaspora policy to create national unity and reconciliation for a new Rwanda. Members of 
the diaspora abroad are portrayed as agents of development and a source of skill and 
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knowledge, playing the role of ambassadors for Rwanda. Turner
40
 makes an intriguing point , 
stating: “The audience here is not only the diaspora, but also Rwandans inside Rwanda as 
well as the international community. In the meanwhile, the diaspora is categorized by the 
state into three categories: a positive diaspora that supports the state; a skeptical diaspora 
whose members may be converted; and a hostile diaspora beyond reach.” The diaspora 
narrative that the state formulates demarcates the boundaries of whom the definition of the 
nation will incorporate and who will be considered a member of this national society.
41
 The 
question of who is deemed a “national hero” or “traitor” then depends on how the home state 
“stages” the diaspora.42  
 
Transnational Authoritarianism 
As Turner argues, the literature on neo-liberal interests in engaging diasporas typically 
ignores political clusters and reduces transnational interactions between the state and the 
citizens abroad to a “technical question of development.”43 However, despite the positive 
sides of state-driven policies, politics saturates “policies of engagement” and nascent 
evidence suggests that these policies also can prompt the transnational oppression of 
communities. States use the methods of accepting diasporas as a means of regulating and 
containing the diaspora.
44
 For instance, Hirt and Saleh Mohammad
45
 dub this phenomenon 
“transnational authoritarian rule,” David Lewis46 calls it “extraterritorial security practices,” 
Dana Moss
47
 defines it as “transnational repression,” and Emma Lundgren Jorum48 opts for 
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the definition of “homeland repression across borders.” Considering that diasporas usually 
comprise conflict-spawned groups who fled their homeland justifiably, it comes as no 
surprise that many countries from the Global South that formulate neo-liberal diaspora 
engagement policies today are hybrid or purely authoritarian regimes, sometimes establishing 
the façade of democratic elections. Lewis
49
 convincingly argues: “The spatial politics of 
authoritarian regimes frequently spill over into transnational space.” Therefore, “a territorial 
conception of authoritarianism falls short in explaining the continuity of autocratic rule in the 
area of globalization.”50 
 
Certain hierarchies among populations also ought to be considered in this context. 
States might govern diasporas by categorizing them as good or bad, useful or useless, or asset 
or threat. They might create “supportive diasporas” by mobilizing state resources to shape 
and reconfigure the diasporic space while simultaneously curbing other diaspora voices that 
do not fit their interest.
51
 For instance, Mylonas claims that some members of the Korean 
diaspora could be deemed more pure-blooded than others, thus creating internal ethnic 
hierarchies.
52
 Home states therefore produce positive and negative diaspora engagement 
policies,
53
 sometimes concurrently. They also may divide diaspora groups into undesired and 
desired populations.
54
 These categorizations rely on the ideology that the state aims to reflect 
in diaspora governance policy. Loyalty to the current regime then becomes the partition 
between good citizens and traitors. In the context of Eritrea, “accusing the government, 
which is inseparably linked to the people, is perceived as an insult of every single Eritrean 
                                                                                                                                                       
48
 Emma Lundgren Jorum (2015) Repression across borders: homeland response to anti-regime mobilization 
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49
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50
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51
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national,” and diaspora members who refuse to comply with government policies are deemed 
traitors.
55
 Hirt and Saleh Mohammad also specify the coerced obligations of the Eritrean 
diaspora to contribute financially to their homeland and to legitimize the regime by 
supporting its policies.
56
 Jorum’s research demonstrates that Syrian authorities engaged in 
purely repressive measures against members of the Syrian diaspora in Sweden who left the 
refugee community and were in the opposition, prompting perpetual feelings of insecurity.
57
 
Meanwhile, Lewis’ study of Uzbekistani diaspora policy clearly evinced: “An authoritarian 
state can use extraterritorial security practices to maintain regime security, by extending the 
scale of domestic political controls across borders into transnational spaces occupied by 
diasporic and exile communities.”58 Another example of negative diaspora engagement is 
Rwanda’s efforts to suppress the dissident diaspora, which it perceives as a hostile political 
and security threat. Rwandan authorities consider these dissidents enemies in the national 
narrative, favor other groups in the diaspora, and create a separate supportive or 
developmental diaspora.
59
  
 
The distinction between good and bad diasporas transcends the rhetoric of the state. 
The monitoring and surveillance of diaspora dissidents is common among home-states, 
especially those with authoritarian regimes.
60
 Many authoritarian states perceive their migrant 
communities and diasporas, empowered by globalization and modern technologies of 
communication, as potential threats and they consider this international environment of 
information difficult to monitor and regulate.
61
 It becomes vital for home states to protect the 
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image of the country and the nation abroad. Morocco, for instance, established institutions to 
monitor and control diaspora affairs, and these were “in large part an extension of the 
Moroccan state’s repressive domestic policy.”62 Although these repressive policies directly 
impact the lives of diaspora members, they remain unnoticed among the host society and 
policy-makers.
63
 Alexander Cooley and John Heathershaw’s book, Dictators without 
Borders, is an excellent resource for understanding the reach of dictatorial states to 
individuals exiled internationally and the foreign implementation of domestic policies.
64
 
Their activities include threatening relatives back home, surveillance and monitoring, 
kidnapping, and even assassination. Jorum indicates that, according to the Swedish 
Intelligence Service (SAPO), about 20 state security services engage in illegal intelligence 
activity, infiltrating oppositional movements, and employing various threats to intimidate and 
prosecute dissidents on Swedish soil:  
 
Some have embassy or trade office staff dedicated solely mapping oppositional 
groups and their activities. Some have agents placed at national airline offices and 
press agencies or us ‘false refugees’ to infiltrate and report on oppositional 
organizations in Sweden. Threats, often directed at family members still in the state of 
origin, are the most common way these states use to silence dissidents in Sweden.
65
  
 
The Syrian case is not the only example, as other states for decades have used a 
variety of measures, including assassinations and kidnappings: Yugoslav authorities 
employed them against anti-communist groups; Iran targeted political opponents in the 
                                                 
62
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diaspora; and the USSR constantly monitored diaspora organizations.
66
 Today, states such as 
China, Eritrea, Iran, Kazakhstan and Rwanda target dissidents abroad by monitoring, 
conducting intelligence-gathering with help from loyal diaspora organizations, and requesting 
extraditions through INTERPOL.
67
 Scotland Yard, for instance, warned Rwandan citizens 
that they were not safe from assassination attempts.
68
 These actions are no doubt part of a 
state-making process that reinforces sovereignty
69
 and controls loyalty and dissent in the 
extraterritorial context for governance. Researchers have not yet scrutinized adequately the 
issue of how host states answer to such trans-border practices. 
 
Turkey’s Diaspora Policy under the AKP: Reclaiming the Diaspora 
The number of Turkish citizens currently living abroad exceeds 6.5 million, of which 5.5 
million reside in Western Europe.
70
 Although Turkey has been a migrant-sending nation for 
more than 50 years, only in the last decade—under the consecutive reign of AKP 
governments—has the word diaspora become a buzzword for politicians.71 In the era of rising 
state-led diaspora engagement policies, Turkey also became a pioneer in formulating policies 
to cultivate and manage its populations abroad as part of the ruling party’s new domestic and 
foreign policy agenda.
72
 Turkey undoubtedly pursued transnational policies with Turkish 
migrants who migrated due to bilateral agreements with European countries starting in the 
1950s. However, homeland-diaspora relations under AKP rule became a priority for policy-
makers, as the emerging nexus of institutions and other semi- and non-state organizations 
regulated relations between Turkey and its disapora. The paramount institution in this context 
is the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), established in 2010. 
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Other organizations include the Yunus Emre Institutes, TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency), DEIK (Foreign Economic Relations Board), Public Diplomacy 
Coordinator under the Prime Ministry,
73
 and the international branches of the Diyanet.
74
 The 
motives for each initiative varies. As Sebnem Koser Akcapar and Damla Bayraktar Aksel 
argue, upon assuming control in the early 2000s, the AKP government “needed a Turkish 
diaspora to refurbish the image of Turkey and to boost the stale EU membership agenda.
75
 It 
realized that the diaspora could be used in both ways: As a tool for ‘soft power’ and as an 
instrument to support the government’s agenda.” Other political, economic, and cultural 
incentives abounded.
76
 For example, the AKP wanted to forge ties with Turkish business 
networks abroad to enhance its economic outreach, to strengthen its political standing in the 
international arena, and to maintain intact cultural and religious ties with its nationals living 
abroad. Contrary to previous state policies that neglected the diaspora’s agency and potential 
to contribute to state interests, the AKP reclaimed the Turkish diaspora and invested 
considerable time and energy to strengthen ties, build bridges, and sustain these relationships 
by institutionalizing networks.
77
  
 
The activities and services that the YTB and other institutions provide fit into three 
categories: Services that benefit all Turkish citizens and their descendants; services that 
benefit only loyalist groups; and services that criminalize and repress others. The first 
category encompasses the introduction of expatriate voting rights, improved services at 
diplomatic missions, the facilitation of bureaucratic matters online, and policies related to 
pensions and taxes. The YTB significantly invested in ameliorating services abroad toward 
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diaspora members, something that had long been a demand from the diaspora.
78
 Moreover, 
the YTB dedicated time and money in researching Islamophobia and xenophobia and 
published reports and information about racist attacks against Turkish populations abroad. 
Monitoring the well-being of Turkish citizens, especially in Europe, enable it to broadcast the 
impression of expansive extra-territorial outreach. The YTB also funds numerous PhD and 
master’s thesis on topics pertaining to the Turkish diaspora and provides scholarships to 
foreign students and diaspora members to study in Turkey.  
 
Secondly, Turkey created civil society organizations with organic ties to state 
authorities. The most visible of these is the UID (Union of International Democrats), which 
operates in Europe through numerous branches. The YTB and other organizations 
collaborated selectively with these diaspora organizations and declared them the symbolic 
ambassadors
79
 who can advance Turkish interests abroad. The YTB has organized numerous 
activities in Europe and beyond in collaboration with diaspora organizations loyal to the AKP 
and its vision. It lobbied host country governments, organized counter-protests and activities 
in the case of dissident diaspora mobilization, and engaged in versatile activities aimed both 
at cultivating a vigorous and loyal diaspora and creating a favorable and potent image of 
Turkey in Europe. While these policies constituted a large part of creating a transnational 
Turkish Brand, the nexus of institutions and networks also were used to suppress groups of 
dissidents who could obstruct these initiatives. Therefore, as in examples such as Rwanda or 
Eritrea, diaspora governance policy bolstered certain groups in the diaspora to instill a 
positive global image while also transforming the transnational space into a battleground for 
Turkey’s domestic disputes and ambitions. 
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Transnationalizing the Turkish Brand: Soft power and public diplomacy in diaspora 
spaces 
While formulating diaspora engagement policy, Turkey needed to understand what Turkish 
diaspora was and then act according to this definition.
80
 Turkey’s diaspora policy quickly 
morphed into diaspora governance a la Turca, in that state officials redefined the very 
essence of the concept of diaspora according to the new outlook of the AKP. In 2011, former 
prime minister and foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who was a mastermind of Turkish 
foreign and diaspora policies, made the following remark: 
 
We are changing the term of diaspora. We primarily change its content; what it 
contains. We conceive as our own diaspora not only our citizens living abroad, but 
also all kin communities that had been together with us in the past. The first orbit is 
our citizens abroad. Just outside that is the orbit of Albanians, Bosniaks, Circassians, 
Caucasians… Azeri people, all Turkic Republics are in the second orbit. The third 
orbit is composed of everyone who emigrated from these territories in some way and 
then lost their citizenship.
81
  
 
This definition then expanded to incorporate Muslim populations around the world, including 
Palestinians, Rohingya, and Somali.
82
 The policy agenda specifically targeted the Middle 
East, Africa, and the Balkans as potential venues of influence. As a part of public diplomacy 
strategy, the concept of diaspora has found a comprehensive use that includes geographies 
where no sizeable Turkish diaspora exists yet exist as an area of priority on the AKP foreign 
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policy agenda. Expressions such as “Ummah geography”, “Ottoman residues”, and “Islamic 
World” entered the vocabular of diaspora-related institutions in Turkey.83 By formulating 
such a wide policy, the AKP would have managed to insert influence, deploy its disputable 
and relatively ambivalent soft power in Europe through the Turkish diaspora, and mobilize 
wherever else included the so-called Global Ummah.
84
 For example, despite the limited 
number of Somalian diaspora members in Turkey, the 3rd International Somali Global 
Diaspora Conference was held in Istanbul under the guidance of Turkey’s transnational state 
apparatuses. This was also an output of Turkey’s ambition to be the “patrol of the Global 
Ummah”. This strategy also aimed to transnationalize a new brand for Turkey that would be 
more inclusive, active, and engaging in the international arena under the AKP compared to its 
predecessors. For Turkish citizens around the world, this would demonstrate the extent of 
their home state’s power to care for them despite the distance and that they are part of the 
Turkish nation—an inseparable component of the Turkish national identity and psyche. The 
AKP envisaged that re-embracing kin and diaspora would not only make Turkey stronger but 
also harness prestige in the international arena. Thus, becomes valid the argument that 
Turkey managed to transform its diaspora policies into “transnational state spectacles”85 and 
stage a new ideological outlook that the ruling elites pursue. 
 
As the AKP has transformed Turkey and Turkish society, it became a priority to 
create and sell to the masses a national narrative. Not only the “new Turkish story” but also 
the novel vision of the AKP must be communicated and promoted to its international 
audience—the diaspora Turks. The regime change that is slowly but steadfastly materializing 
in Turkey, for its survival and ability to withstand dissent, must engender a narrative that that 
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the domestic population and diaspora appreciate. For the perpetuity of the new regime in 
Turkey, nation-branding ultimately becomes a practice that unavoidably addresses loyal 
citizens, who then intricately, legitimately, and extensively bear the image of that nation to 
broader audiences. In other words, the new brand needs “brand ambassadors” or “new public 
diplomats”86 who will help the Turkish state sustain its sovereignty in the international arena. 
The diaspora policy therefore became a useful instrument for the government, and its 
institutions transformed into transnational state apparatuses that can function to spread the 
ideology of the ruling class.  
 
Turkey’s diaspora strategy carefully took shape after diplomats, politicians, and 
experts examined a variety of cases from around the world. DEIK for instance published a 
strategy report that drew from the examples of Israel, Armenia, India, and Ireland. The report 
focused on issues such as increasing the lobbying potential of diasporas, erecting bridges 
between Turkish diaspora organizations, integrating second-generation diaspora members 
into nation-building practices, supporting integration but preventing assimilation, forging 
relations with other ethnic and religious diaspora groups, and globally disseminating Turkish 
cultural norms. One interesting recommendation by DEIK pertained to engaging with 
propaganda against Turkey; experts suggested that the Turkish diaspora engage with policy-
makers rather than dissident diasporas that create propaganda and reveal a conciliatory rather 
than fanatic or intransigent attitude. Some of these principles remained intact for the last 
decade, while others have faded due to the political climate and shifting priorities in Turkey. 
Turkish policy-makers have combined a lessons-learnt approach from other cases with 
Turkey’s own domestic dynamics—increasing the role of Islam, Neo-ottoman vision, and 
political polarization—and created a highly functioning state apparatus useful for both 
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ideological dissemination and repression when necessary. It is, however, vulnerable to 
political shifts in Turkey, as its continuation relies on the political success of the AKP.  
 
Transnational Authoritarianism: Monitoring and Surveillance 
Although Turkey’s public diplomacy and soft power efforts through diaspora policy appeared 
successful in various African countries and the Balkans, diaspora strategies quickly backfired 
in Europe for assorted reasons. Turkey made vast investments in governmental and non-
governmental organizations in Europe to further the AKP’s agenda abroad. Besides lobbying, 
mobilizing civil society and diaspora organizations, and coordinating educational and cultural 
events, transnational state apparatuses have been used to monitor and control dissident 
diaspora groups. The democratic decline in Turkey fostered a negative perception of the 
country in the West, and augmented intelligence activities in Europe under the disguise of 
diaspora engagement policy provoked negative reactions from policy-makers in host 
countries. This authoritarian descent has reflected in both diaspora policies and the domestic 
political agenda, especially following the 2016 coup attempt. The same nexus of institutions 
and non-governmental organizations designed for public diplomacy efforts also sought to 
facilitate a web for surveilling and monitoring new and old enemies of Turkey. Svante 
Cornell, a renowned scholar, called this “weaponizing the diaspora.”87 
 
Turkey notably always has monitored dissident groups abroad closely. In previous 
political eras, the Kurdish nationalist movement and political Islamists were the enemies of 
the state.
88
 However, surveillance activities at the time were more discreet and usually 
operated through diplomatic channels. In Turkey after the coup attempt, these activities 
became overt, perhaps to incite fear and demonstrate the reach of the state beyond its borders. 
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In terms of suppressing Kurdish activism abroad, Turkey still follows familiar tactics such as 
pressuring host-country governments to ban Kurdish organizations and activism, label 
Kurdish nationalist movements as terrorists, and prevent them from speaking out after exiting 
Turkey. In the past, Turkey has asked several European countries to ban Kurdish 
broadcasting agencies and newspapers. Turkey also used INTERPOL to denounce Kurdish 
activists as terrorists and ask for their extradition. While this attitude continues under the new 
diaspora policy, what has changed perhaps is the digital outreach of the state. In the post-
coup-attempt political environment, numerous Kurdish, leftist, and Alevi diaspora activists 
were arrested or detained at Turkish airports when visiting Turkey due to social media posts 
criticizing Turkish policies or President Erdogan.
89
 However, despite the ongoing 
criminalization of the Kurds in the transnational space, the AKP appears to prioritize the 
Gulen Movement, which it has accused of orchestrating the coup,
90
 and perceives it as the 
primary enemy to eliminate at home and abroad. Now that the Gulen Movement cannot 
survive within Turkish borders due to an active purge of its members, it must survive in exile. 
This, however, will not be easy. The YTB and the Diyanet targeted Gulenists abroad using 
social media and mobilizing on the ground, demonstrating explicitly the extent of the state’s 
national security concerns abroad.
91
 For instance, the YTB’s Twitter account tweeted 
numerous times about the Gulen movement as a terrorist organization in many different 
languages. Turkey’s international Diyanet branches have faced accusations of spying on 
Gulenists using imams as informants.
92
 Newspapers report that Turkey has filed over a 
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thousand requests with INTERPOL Red Notices to arrest or extradite Turkish nationals.
93
 
More than 600 of these requests ended with denial.
94
 Turkey is heightening its pressure on 
countries outside of Europe and is focusing especially on Africa, where Gulenists maintain 
immense academic and commercial networks, to ban their activities.
95
 Some extreme cases 
include the kidnapping of Gulenists from various countries, including Kosovo.
96
 The task of 
surveillance is not confined solely to channels of diplomacy or law enforcement. This task 
also has been subcontracted to loyal diaspora members who gather intelligence and denounce 
dissidents in the diaspora to the Turkish authorities. These new trends of intimidation directly 
influence diaspora spaces; they demonstrate clearly how transnational authoritarianism 
impacts individuals and creates feelings of insecurity and mistrust despite the distance from 
the homeland.
97
 Self-censorship and withdrawal from activities are proof of this existing 
repression.
98
 Gulenist communities opt to distance themselves from other Turkish groups. All 
dissident groups also face legal threats, including the confiscation of passports, the refusal of 
service at Turkish consulates, and court cases filed against them in Turkey. Even simple 
actions such as extending visas or providing lawyers with powers of attorney in Turkey are 
challenging for exiled groups. 
 
Moss theorizes transnational repression under certain categories: lethal retribution, 
threats, surveillance, exile, withdrawing state benefits, and proxy punishment.
99
 In the case of 
Turkey, we observe all these categories at varying levels of intensity depending on the 
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region, and diaspora management institutions act as repressive state apparatuses when 
needed. A narrative around the success of Turkey’s new diaspora policy accompanies that of 
Turkey as a rising figure in transnational authoritarian practices. Both negative and positive 
diaspora engagement practices occur simultaneously, operated by roughly the same 
governmental and non-governmental actors.  
 
Conclusion 
This article demonstrated that home states can formulate both negative and positive 
engagement practices with their diasporas under the umbrella of the same diaspora 
governance policy. State-led diaspora engagement typically emerges in the shadow of the 
ruling elite’s agenda and interests, and the ruling ideology drives its main motivations, 
whether economic, political, or cultural. Therefore, as we discuss diaspora governance, we 
also must consider the politics of engagement—a closer scrutiny on domestic politics, foreign 
policy agendas, and ethnic, ideological, and religious hierarchies in the homeland. In this 
article, we revealed that public diplomacy and soft power initiatives accompany transnational 
authoritarian practices, often controlled by the same governmental and non-governmental 
organizations. Home states can configure diaspora management institutions and networks for 
their utilization as transnational state apparatuses to advance state interests abroad. 
The case of Turkey indicates that policy-makers categorize diasporas as good or bad, 
loyal or dissident, hostile or useful, and then tailor policies to engage with or disengage from 
them in a diasporic sphere dominated by home-state narratives. The dominant national 
narrative that ruling elites create upon forming diaspora governance policies thus answered 
the questions of who belongs to the diaspora and who is part of the nation. It comes as no 
surprise that Turkey’s diaspora initiatives more often discuss Muslim or Turkic populations 
in the Middle East or Africa rather than other diaspora groups from Turkey, such as Alevites, 
 23 
Kurds, or Armenians. Which citizens state elites consider acceptable determines whether 
engagement will be negative or positive, thus making diaspora policy and its institutions 
susceptible to political changes in Turkey. The current policy is undeniably a reflection of the 
AKP agenda. Its public diplomacy pillar has found little success in Europe but relatively has 
flourished elsewhere in the world. It actively pursues its pillar of transnational 
authoritarianism in countries where state authorities feel obliged to suppress the diaspora. 
The future of Turkey’s diaspora policy if the AKP loses an election remains unforeseeable. 
What is certain, however, is that the potential of the diaspora has received widespread 
acknowledgement, and its sustained relations are entrenched. 
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